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| Fonte da imagem: Picture-Aliance/AP Photo/ |
Texto de Manuela Carneiro da Cunha, traduzido do francês por Duff Morton, e dirigido ao público internacional.
(Manuela Carneiro da Cunha is Professor Emerita, the University of Chicago, and Professor (retired), Universidade de São Paulo (Brazil). She is a member of the Brazilian Academy of Sciences.)
Indigenous peoples boxed in by Brazil’s political crisis
Escolha a barra de Tradutor na lateral do blog. A imagem é apenas ilustrativa.
Manuela CARNEIRO DA CUNHA,University of Chicago and University of São Paulo.
After two decades of military dictatorship, a new Constitution proclaimed in 1988 gave pride of place to human rights and the protection of the environment. Nicknamed the Citizen Constitution, it expressed hope for a regime of justice and democracy. Thirty years on, it has suffered from all sorts of distortions: its terms have been violated, as occurs so often with such documents, and, even more seriously, constitutional amendments and decrees have attempted to disfigure it.
A great many conflicts involve land and its use. Land outside of the real estate market is particularly coveted. Such land includes territory recognized to indigenous peoples and to the descendants of maroon communities (the quilombolas), along with plots redistributed through the national agrarian reform program. All of these are now the targets of new policy proposals.
Across Amazonia, different actors sneak onto protected lands: the grileiros, who illegally take over territory by making use of documents forged out of whole cloth; the illicit lumberjacks, pillagers of valuable woods, who prospect the region with more and more sophisticated methods; the gold miners and other mining interests. Agribusiness, soy and cattle raising at its forefront, is claiming more and more space for its activities. These already occupy the majority of another precious ecosystem – the Cerrado – and impinge powerfully on eastern Amazonia, especially in the state of Pará.
In other areas, conflicts also spring from older territorial evictions. Such is the case with the central-west region of the country, which includes Mato Grosso do Sul state and the western part of Paraná. This territory was “colonized” with government encouragement during the 1940s. Guarani people were violently dislodged and forced into small reservations. They have for decades sought to recover their traditional lands. Current occupants, backed by private militias, are fighting them. As a result, a string of assassinations ensues. This tragedy is well documented in Vincent Carelli’s recent film “Martyr.”
Such conflicts are endemic, not simply the work of those who have recently begun invading public land. During the debates over the 1988 Constitution, indigenous peoples’ rights were already opposed by the mining industry and actors who were interested (for various reasons) in infrastructure construction. It is not difficult to spot the very profitable bribes involved in dam building, and thereby to reveal the links that connect political parties to the promoters of that which, in Brazil, is still referred to as “development.”
Infringing more and more on indigenous peoples’ territories, the policy of dam-building in Brazil stretches back to the 1970s and the period of military dictatorship. This policy has particular importance for the mining industry and agribusiness. It was revived near the end of President Lula’s second term, with the Belo Monte Dam on the Xingu River and two dams on the Madeira River, which, once again, impacted several indigenous societies and riverine dwellers, the ribeirinhos. The current economic crisis has put on hold a plan for five large dams in the Tapajós basin, which would directly affect the Munduruku people.
A number of constitutional amendment proposals – referred to by the Portuguese-language acronym PEC – have been held in suspended animation for years, even decades, waiting for the right moment to be placed on the agenda of the House of Deputies. PEC 215, one of the worst menaces currently afflicting indigenous territories, is originally from 2000. Decisions about when and how to demarcate land have always been made by the executive branch, but this amendment would grant that power to the legislative branch, where agribusiness – in open opposition to indigenous peoples’ interests – is strongly represented. The amendment would even require that Congress go through the process of ratifying indigenous lands that have already been recognized. Rejected when it originally passed through the Constitutional Committee, this amendment proposal was resurrected fifteen years later by the president of the House of Deputies - currently in prison under corruption accusations - and sent again to the Constitutional Committee. It was no surprise that it was approved this time around. So PEC 215 could now be placed on the congressional agenda and voted on when the moment is right. And the right moment could well be right now.
Across Amazonia, different actors sneak onto protected lands: the grileiros, who illegally take over territory by making use of documents forged out of whole cloth; the illicit lumberjacks, pillagers of valuable woods, who prospect the region with more and more sophisticated methods; the gold miners and other mining interests. Agribusiness, soy and cattle raising at its forefront, is claiming more and more space for its activities. These already occupy the majority of another precious ecosystem – the Cerrado – and impinge powerfully on eastern Amazonia, especially in the state of Pará.
In other areas, conflicts also spring from older territorial evictions. Such is the case with the central-west region of the country, which includes Mato Grosso do Sul state and the western part of Paraná. This territory was “colonized” with government encouragement during the 1940s. Guarani people were violently dislodged and forced into small reservations. They have for decades sought to recover their traditional lands. Current occupants, backed by private militias, are fighting them. As a result, a string of assassinations ensues. This tragedy is well documented in Vincent Carelli’s recent film “Martyr.”
Such conflicts are endemic, not simply the work of those who have recently begun invading public land. During the debates over the 1988 Constitution, indigenous peoples’ rights were already opposed by the mining industry and actors who were interested (for various reasons) in infrastructure construction. It is not difficult to spot the very profitable bribes involved in dam building, and thereby to reveal the links that connect political parties to the promoters of that which, in Brazil, is still referred to as “development.”
Infringing more and more on indigenous peoples’ territories, the policy of dam-building in Brazil stretches back to the 1970s and the period of military dictatorship. This policy has particular importance for the mining industry and agribusiness. It was revived near the end of President Lula’s second term, with the Belo Monte Dam on the Xingu River and two dams on the Madeira River, which, once again, impacted several indigenous societies and riverine dwellers, the ribeirinhos. The current economic crisis has put on hold a plan for five large dams in the Tapajós basin, which would directly affect the Munduruku people.
A number of constitutional amendment proposals – referred to by the Portuguese-language acronym PEC – have been held in suspended animation for years, even decades, waiting for the right moment to be placed on the agenda of the House of Deputies. PEC 215, one of the worst menaces currently afflicting indigenous territories, is originally from 2000. Decisions about when and how to demarcate land have always been made by the executive branch, but this amendment would grant that power to the legislative branch, where agribusiness – in open opposition to indigenous peoples’ interests – is strongly represented. The amendment would even require that Congress go through the process of ratifying indigenous lands that have already been recognized. Rejected when it originally passed through the Constitutional Committee, this amendment proposal was resurrected fifteen years later by the president of the House of Deputies - currently in prison under corruption accusations - and sent again to the Constitutional Committee. It was no surprise that it was approved this time around. So PEC 215 could now be placed on the congressional agenda and voted on when the moment is right. And the right moment could well be right now.
A new level of violence.
To understand the rising strength of a new level of violence in rural Brazil, one must begin by considering its context: a political crisis without precedent. This crisis has ravaged numerous domains of Brazilian life, and traditional populations and the environment are especially affected.
To a growing extent over the past several legislative sessions, the House of Deputies and the Senate have been dominated by a number of representatives and senators who – regardless of their political party affiliation – vote as a bloc on certain legislative proposals. These elected officials make up what in Brazil is called the “ruralista front.” They express the interests of the great landowners, involved principally in extensive cattle ranching and large-scale farming of soy, corn, and sugarcane, who are the public face for the totality of Brazilian agribusiness, which includes Cargill, Bunge, Syngenta and others. Under the Agriculture and Ranching Confederation of Brazil, landowners present themselves as key economic actors bringing in foreign currency in a period characterized by recession and massive unemployment which, for the first time, has exceeded 13%. Their economic power translates into political power, especially in the legislature. Their platform includes the end of new demarcations of indigenous land, the abolition of the National Indian Foundation (FUNAI), a reduction in the size of areas set aside for environmental conservation, and the loosening of environmental regulations.
Over the last ten years, as the ruralista front has increased in power -- both economic and parliamentary, traditional populations and the environment have been subjected to more and more muscular attacks. Environmental and indigenous groups have also suffered notable defeats, such as the 2012 adoption of a new Forest Code and the granting of amnesty for previous violations of environmental rules. If one compares the acreage of indigenous lands that were registered over the past six presidential terms – from Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-1999, 1999-2003) to Lula (2003-2007, 2007-2011) to Dilma Rousseff (2011-2014, 2015- May 2016) – one immediately notes the inverse relationship to the rise of the ruralista front in the legislature. Fernando Henrique broke records for the scale of indigenous land demarcation, benefitting from financial support from the German government for this purpose. Lula, during his first term, increased the number of conservation units. He also helped resolve a thirty-year-old dispute, with the result that the invaders of Macuxi indigenous land, in the state of Roraima, were expelled. But the government of Dilma Rousseff gave few indications of favoring the environment, agrarian reform, or the rights of indigenous people and quilombolas.
Thus, the current situation is not new. What has changed the game is the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff and the rise to power of her vice-president, Michel Temer. Suffering from extremely low popular approval ratings, subject to corruption accusations, he continues – as of the present moment – to be held in office by the financial and industrial sectors. Not needing to worry about his popularity (since he has never had any), and known for his skill at handling agreements inside Congress, President Temer presents himself as being capable of pushing through changes that are widely unpopular, particularly a reform of labor legislation and changes in government-guaranteed retirement pensions.
Of the 513 members of the House of Deputies, the ruralista front claims to command at present 228. Moreover, they have two powerful allies: pentecostal deputies and the group that advocates the right to bear arms. United, the three make up what is known in Brazil as the BBB Front, that is, the front of Beef, the Bible, and the Bullet. President Temer seeks support in the House of Deputies and the Senate by distributing ministerial posts to allied parties and, in particular, by granting concessions to the ruralistas front. Following a practice used by Dilma Rousseff, he has become well-known (and even created an uproar) for issuing Provisional Measures, presidential decrees that must be subsequently approved by Congress and return to the president for sanctioning. These decrees cover a variety of subjects, but their common characteristic is eliminating protections and weakening regulations. For example, banks were exempted from the requirement of verifying that the projects they plan to finance have respected environmental rules.
One decree in particular (MP 756) targets the National Park and the National Forest of Jamanxim in Eastern Amazonia. More than half of the National Forest of Jamanxim would be cut off, along with a part of the National Park of the same name – around six hundred thousand hectares in all. This case speaks eloquently: it means the dismemberment of the mosaic of conservation units that link the Xingu and Tapajós basins.
This is a mosaic with a very specific history. It was created in 2006 to reassure those who protested against a road, BR 163 that allowed for soy production from Mato Grosso to flow to the grain port of Santarém, on the Amazon River. One could have predicted that this road – which was in the process of being covered in tarmac – would serve, like all of the Amazonian highways, to spearhead a new onslaught on the forest. The government promised that, this time, a barrier would be erected against the damage created by the project, and for this reason eight conservation units were
To a growing extent over the past several legislative sessions, the House of Deputies and the Senate have been dominated by a number of representatives and senators who – regardless of their political party affiliation – vote as a bloc on certain legislative proposals. These elected officials make up what in Brazil is called the “ruralista front.” They express the interests of the great landowners, involved principally in extensive cattle ranching and large-scale farming of soy, corn, and sugarcane, who are the public face for the totality of Brazilian agribusiness, which includes Cargill, Bunge, Syngenta and others. Under the Agriculture and Ranching Confederation of Brazil, landowners present themselves as key economic actors bringing in foreign currency in a period characterized by recession and massive unemployment which, for the first time, has exceeded 13%. Their economic power translates into political power, especially in the legislature. Their platform includes the end of new demarcations of indigenous land, the abolition of the National Indian Foundation (FUNAI), a reduction in the size of areas set aside for environmental conservation, and the loosening of environmental regulations.
Over the last ten years, as the ruralista front has increased in power -- both economic and parliamentary, traditional populations and the environment have been subjected to more and more muscular attacks. Environmental and indigenous groups have also suffered notable defeats, such as the 2012 adoption of a new Forest Code and the granting of amnesty for previous violations of environmental rules. If one compares the acreage of indigenous lands that were registered over the past six presidential terms – from Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-1999, 1999-2003) to Lula (2003-2007, 2007-2011) to Dilma Rousseff (2011-2014, 2015- May 2016) – one immediately notes the inverse relationship to the rise of the ruralista front in the legislature. Fernando Henrique broke records for the scale of indigenous land demarcation, benefitting from financial support from the German government for this purpose. Lula, during his first term, increased the number of conservation units. He also helped resolve a thirty-year-old dispute, with the result that the invaders of Macuxi indigenous land, in the state of Roraima, were expelled. But the government of Dilma Rousseff gave few indications of favoring the environment, agrarian reform, or the rights of indigenous people and quilombolas.
Thus, the current situation is not new. What has changed the game is the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff and the rise to power of her vice-president, Michel Temer. Suffering from extremely low popular approval ratings, subject to corruption accusations, he continues – as of the present moment – to be held in office by the financial and industrial sectors. Not needing to worry about his popularity (since he has never had any), and known for his skill at handling agreements inside Congress, President Temer presents himself as being capable of pushing through changes that are widely unpopular, particularly a reform of labor legislation and changes in government-guaranteed retirement pensions.
Of the 513 members of the House of Deputies, the ruralista front claims to command at present 228. Moreover, they have two powerful allies: pentecostal deputies and the group that advocates the right to bear arms. United, the three make up what is known in Brazil as the BBB Front, that is, the front of Beef, the Bible, and the Bullet. President Temer seeks support in the House of Deputies and the Senate by distributing ministerial posts to allied parties and, in particular, by granting concessions to the ruralistas front. Following a practice used by Dilma Rousseff, he has become well-known (and even created an uproar) for issuing Provisional Measures, presidential decrees that must be subsequently approved by Congress and return to the president for sanctioning. These decrees cover a variety of subjects, but their common characteristic is eliminating protections and weakening regulations. For example, banks were exempted from the requirement of verifying that the projects they plan to finance have respected environmental rules.
One decree in particular (MP 756) targets the National Park and the National Forest of Jamanxim in Eastern Amazonia. More than half of the National Forest of Jamanxim would be cut off, along with a part of the National Park of the same name – around six hundred thousand hectares in all. This case speaks eloquently: it means the dismemberment of the mosaic of conservation units that link the Xingu and Tapajós basins.
This is a mosaic with a very specific history. It was created in 2006 to reassure those who protested against a road, BR 163 that allowed for soy production from Mato Grosso to flow to the grain port of Santarém, on the Amazon River. One could have predicted that this road – which was in the process of being covered in tarmac – would serve, like all of the Amazonian highways, to spearhead a new onslaught on the forest. The government promised that, this time, a barrier would be erected against the damage created by the project, and for this reason eight conservation units were
Fonte da imagem: http://www.dw.com/pt-br/confronto-entre-%C3%ADndios-e-policiais-em-protesto-em-bras%C3%ADlia/a-38590326
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